However, the policy has failed to take hold in Saudi Arabia, an important ally to the US in the region. The policy has failed because the US has chosen not to hold the Saudi government accountable for reform. The reason is two fold: The US is seen as the protectorate of the West and nations would like to see the US keep pressure on oil producing countries like Saudi Arabia to maintain fair prices; and Saudi Arabia is a key Arab ally in the region and is seen as a counter to an Iranian move toward hegemony. With these two issues in mind the Bush administration has toed a vague line when dealing with the Saudis, by calling for reform in the open but then turning the proverbial cheek in private.
There is no reason why the Bush administration should not have a pro-active role regarding its democratic reform policy towards Saudi Arabia. US-Saudi relations have begun to deteriorate since the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003. King Abdullah has even to go as far as calling the US occupation of Iraq “illegal.” Following the invasion of Iraq the US withdrew troops stationed in Saudi Arabia and handed over control of Prince Sultan Air Base to the Saudi Air Force thus ending a militarily strategic partnership. Saudi Arabia also created a unified Palestinian front between Fatah and Hamas at the Mecca accords earlier this year which went against US wishes.
The most important factor regarding a call for reform is the energy factor. It is no dark secret that the US is the number one consumer of oil in the world, but Saudi Arabia is not the US’s number one import partner. Saudi Arabia currently is third behind Canada and Mexico in crude oil imports, and fourth in petroleum imports with Venezuela one spot in front of them at third.[2] The US has embarked on a mission to find alternative fuel sources so the country will no longer be dependent on foreign sources. With the alternative fuel source initiative in the administrations back pocket there should be no hesitation to confront the Saudis on reform.
SAUDI GOVERNMENT
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with no prime minister or presidential positions within its government. Saudi kings are direct descendents of Ibn Saud, the first king of Saudi Arabia. The government holds the Islamic holy book, the Quran, as its constitution and it’s laws are based on the Islamic principles of Shir’a law. Saudi Arabia does have a legislative body called the Ulema but the members are appointed only by the king, not through an election.
Saudi Arabia is an oil rich state and has become incredibly wealthy as a result of the mass exportation of it. With oil export revenues making up around 90-95% of total Saudi export earnings, 70-80% of state revenues, and around 40% of the country’s gross domestic product, Saudi Arabia’s economy remains, despite attempts at diversification, heavily dependent on oil.[3] Saudi Arabia enjoys multi-billion dollar incomes every fiscal year with 2006 bringing in an estimated $160 billion (US) in 2006. However, with such a large amount of income, distribution of the wealth is sparse among the kingdom. Saudi Arabia’s GDP per capita (PPP) is around $14,000 (US)[4] and is fifth among the six Gulf Cooperation Council states. Put on top of that a large portion of the population is under the age of thirty and the high rate of unemployment, hovering at around 30%, a sense of unrest could begin to brew.
Saudi Arabia is a rentier state, with the royal family and a circle of elites benefiting from the revenues of the oil trade. Those who control the oil do not have a positive few of privatizing the market. In Saudi Arabia, as in other oil rich states, there is still a considerable resistance among the elite who enjoy huge oil rents. A fundamental shift to a more open, transparent economy, would threaten these benefits.[5] With the vast amounts of wealth coming in to the royal family and the elites, the more they are able to entrench themselves politically.
The Saudi government also seeks to suppress underground political movements and organizations. The government has banned all political parties and does not allow the freedom to assemble and protest. Dissenters are usually jailed and sometimes tortured or exiled. The government also practices state sponsored censorship over the media outlets within the country but is limited in doing so with foreign satellite television channels.
Saudi Arabia treads a thin line when it comes to its claim that they (Saudi Arabia) are the protectors of Islam, yet they devalue those who use Islam as a political platform within its boundaries. The al-Saud family practices Wahhabism, a conservative form of Islam. The parties that oppose the regime practice and even more conservative form of Islam one that is defined by the US government as extreme. It is these groups that oppose Saudi Arabia’s relations with the West and the government’s misuse of oil revenue. It is these groups that have also attracted the unemployed and disenfranchised Saudi youth as well as implored the use of violence to spread their message.
US – SAUDI RELATIONSHIP BACKGROUND
The US has strong relationships with many Arab Middle Eastern countries, in particular the Gulf States. Many of these ties were formed during and following World War II. The US government along with many American businesses became key actors in the development of the region following the discovery of oil. Agreements were signed by the ruling families of oil producing states that would secure American economic interests for long periods of time.
The US-Saudi relationship began with oil. After oil was discovered in Bahrain in 1932, Saudi Arabia gave an oil concession to Standard Oil of Southern California in 1933. The original concession totaled about 360,000 square miles, and when oil was discovered in 1938 it was expanded to 440,000 square miles, nearly half the total size of Saudi Arabia.
At the onset of World War II, Saudi Arabia was seen as a key strategic location to the US war effort in Europe and Japan. Saudi Arabia became a key stopping-off point for men and equipment on their way to the Pacific theatre as well as a re-supply route to the eastern front in Europe. Designs were also planned for the building of a large air base in Dhahran (The base was later completed in 1950). Saudi Arabia also became eligible for the President Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease Act, one of only three Arab nations to do so.[6]
As World War II ended and the Cold War began, the US saw Saudi Arabia as a key ally to countering Soviet aggression in the region. The US was able to invoke Saudi Arabia’s use of Islam as a tool to deter “God-less Communism.” The US also gave support to Saudi Arabia to counter Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism movement out of Egypt. Saudi Arabia became an even more intricate player for the US in the region after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Once Iran could no longer be counted on as a US ally, the Reagan administration came to rely on Saudi Arabia to serve as a bulwark against Iranian expansion and Russian meddling.[7] Saudi Arabia also became a stopping-off point for US arms shipments to Afghanistan to aid the mujahadien in their fight against the Soviets.
The early 1990’s witnessed the first global conflict since the end of the Cold War and cemented the importance of the Gulf Region to Western interests. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait galvanized the global community to create an international coalition to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and restore order to the region. The US spearheaded the Gulf War campaign and used Saudi Arabia as a military staging ground. After Iraq was defeated and UN sanctions were implemented, the US Air Force was stationed in Saudi Arabia to enforce the northern and southern no fly zones inside Iraq. The US military withdrew their personnel from Saudi Arabia in 2003 and handed over operational control of Prince Sultan Air Base to the Saudi Air Force.
Of course like all relationships, the US and Saudi Arabia have had, and still have, differences. The 1973 oil embargo presented a major obstacle to the US as did the constant Saudi criticism of US support for Israel. The terrorist attacks on September 11th also proved to be a strain on US-Saudi relations. The US public grumbled loudly when it was discovered that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia also did not approve of the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
US-SAUDI ECONOMIC TIES
The most obvious economic tie the US has with Saudi Arabia is the one with the oil industry. Saudi Arabia has become the US’s key player in OPEC (Organization of Oil Exporting Countries). The US feels it can use Saudi Arabia as leverage in trying to maintain the status-quo inside OPEC and to keep prices low. The relationship has had its rough patches though. At the end of 1973, in response to US support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war, Saudi Arabia imposed an embargo on oil exports to the United States. (Others included in the complete embargo were Holland, Portugal, Rhodesia, South Africa and South Yemen) The embargo led to immediate cutbacks in production and a significant rise in the price of oil. In order to end the embargo and shore up political ties with Saudi Arabia, the US signed an agreement with the Kingdom to provide extensive military and economic cooperation. In return the US called on Saudi Arabia to cooperate in supplying the energy needs of the United States and its allies.[8]
The US was also a strong proponent for Saudi Arabia’s ascension into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Saudi Arabia was accepted in December 2005 and now must adhere to the charter of the WTO, which means having friendly trade relations with all member states including Israel.[9] Also in accordance with the WTO charter, Saudi Arabia will also need to open its economy to liberalization and privatization.[10]
The military relationship has taken on a new phase as Saudi Arabia has come to replace Iran as the leading American military ally in the Persian Gulf.[11] In fact the US has been making arms deals with Saudi Arabia since the close of Word War II. Between 1950 and 1992, US-Saudi arms agreements totaled over $52 billion (US)[12]; that is 22% of the total value of US arms agreements with the rest of the world n that same time period. Between the mid 1970’s and early 1980’s the value of the deals began to increase. The Saudis sought and received technologically advanced weapon systems such as Maverick air-to-surface missiles, F-15 fighter jets, AWAC (airborne early warning air craft), Blackhawk helicopters, M1A1 Abrams tanks, Stinger missiles, and various air-to-air and surface-to-sea missile systems.
In 1993 Saudi Arabia made an initial offer of $7 billion (US) for seventy-two F-15 fighter planes. But as mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia was burdened with a large war debt and falling oil prices. Between 1994 and 1997 the value of the deal had changed to $4 billion (US), and between 1998 and 2001 had fallen to around $600 million (US).[13] The US made certain that Saudi Arabia was their number one Arab ally in the region by denying Egypt a deal to purchase AH-64A Apache helicopters and approving Saudi Arabia’s purchase them instead.[14]
During the flurry of Saudi Arabia’s arms purchasing during the 1970’s it did not overlook the infrastructure of the military itself. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia put 70% of its military spending into creating and developing its military infrastructure.[15] A consequence of the spending spree during the 1970’s and 1980’s was a conventional arms race between Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran and Egypt.
However, not all arms agreements went smoothly through congress. In 1985 the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lobbied congress to block a sale of F-15 fighter jets to the kingdom. The afore-mentioned economic downturn in the early 1990’s also severely hindered a large arms agreement. Saudi Arabia’s poor human rights record has not hindered the US from selling arms to them. Saudi Arabia’s position as a strategic Gulf ally has blinded U.S. officials into approving a level and quality of arms exports that should never have been allowed to a non-democratic country with a poor human rights record.[16]
PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY
The call for democratization will be a key foreign policy point for many US presidential administrations in the future, as it has been for administrations of the past. In the context of today’s threats to the US (i.e. Islamic fanaticism and terrorism) the idea of democratic reform is a double edged sword. If the US backs away from its push for democratization they will be seen as abandoning their ideals and values addressing global change. On the other hand, if democratic reform is pushed in the region, then opposition groups with extremist views will be given a political platform from which to challenge the status-quo.
Saudi Arabia recently held municipal elections, however only males were allowed to vote. The government did not allow women to take part in the municipal elections that took place in early 2005. Prince Mansour bin Miteb bin Abdul Aziz, head of the elections committee, announced in advance of the elections that the country did not have sufficient time to prepare for both women and men to vote, indicating that Saudi Arabia would require separate polling stations run by female election judges before it allowed women to participate politically.[17]
Even though these elections are a positive step in the democratization process, the outcome of the election had no direct effect on the central power base. The election also had no direct effect on the legislative body. So even though an election was held, the only ruling bodies that were affected were the local ones, and in the scheme of things they are still ultimately controlled by Riyadh.
As it stands now, as long as US interests are being served in the region they (the US) will be content with the ruling government; especially if that government is suppressing opposition parties that hold negative views towards the US. The US also needs to maintain a strong Arab ally in the region to counter the possible threat of a nuclear Iran. The US can still push its policy for the promotion of democracy in order to maintain its progressive status in the global community; but underneath the US will respect the status-quo of the ruling government.
The US needs to ask itself a question: Does it want the world to see them as a “hypocritical state?” That is the way the world will view the US while it promotes democracy to some states yet openly supports regimes in other states that rule with iron fists. In order for the US’s democratization policy to be effective in countries like Saudi Arabia, they would need to abandon a stance that creates a double standard. The US has the ability to press for democratic reform in Saudi Arabia and should not back down from doing so. A more democratic Saudi Arabia will be seen as progressive step towards change in the region, a first step that other countries will have the opportunity to follow in.
[1] President George W. Bush, Inaugural address
[2] Energy Information Association
[3] Data given by the Energy Information Association. Tolitz, Nino P., editor Saudi Arabia: Terrorism, U.S. Relations and Oil (New York: Nova Sciences Publishers, 2005) p. 61
[4] CIA World Fact Book, 2005
[5] In Support of Arab Democracy: Why and How? This was an independent report sponsored by the Council
on Foreign Relations. The report was co-chaired by Madeleine Albright and Vin Weber. The report was
created during September 2004 through February 2005.
[6] James F. Byrnes, President Roosevelt’s director of the Office of War Mobilization from May until April 1945, testified that FDR had “determined that in view of the strategic location of Saudi Arabia, the important oil resources of that country and the prestige of King Ibn Saud throughout the Arab world, the defense of Saudi Arabia was vital to the defense of the United States.” Bronson, Rachel. Thicker than Oil: Americas Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) p.24
[7] Bronson, p. 25
[8] Wilson, Rodney, “Good International Governance: Implications for Saudi Arabia’s Political Economy,”
Good Governance in the Middle East Oil Monarchies ed. Tom Pierre Najem & Martin Hetherington
(New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003) p. 86
[9] If there is one strain that will remain constant in US-Saudi relations, it is the issue regarding Israel and
Palestine.
[10] “Saudi WTO Membership Approved”
[11] Miglietta, John P., American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002) p.278
[12] Ibid p.266, Table 7.1
[13] Pollack, Josh, “Saudi Arabia and the United States: 1931-2002.” Middle East Review of International Affairs (September 2002) Vol. 6, No.3
[14] US Arms Clients Profiles
[15] Cordesman, Anthony. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985)
p. 159
[16] US Arms Clients Profiles
[17] Freedom House country report on Saudi Arabia in 2005
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